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The Tears of a Killer
Criminal Trials and Sentimentalism in the Austrian Netherlands1
elwin hofman
A style of feeling known as the ‘cult of sensibility’ swept through Europe in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, stressing the importance of both sympathy 
and public tears. In this article, I argue that this new style to some extent also 
affected common people’s emotional practices in the Southern Netherlands. 
Primarily using trial records, three phases in the history of sensibility are roughly 
distinguished. Up to around 1770, few traces of the cult of sensibility could be found 
and trial records only reported women as occasionally weeping. This changed 
in the 1770s and early 1780s, when men were also said to have wept. Only in the 
1780s and 1790s, however, when male tears were already disappearing again, 
explicit references to sympathy were found. In the conclusion, I reflect upon the 
possibilities of trial records to study the history of emotions.
De tranen van een moordenaar. Strafprocessen en sentimentalisme in de Oostenrijkse 
Nederlanden
Een cultus van het gevoel waarde door het Europa van de tweede helft van de 
achttiende eeuw. De nadruk lag daarbij op zowel medelijden als publieke tranen. 
In dit artikel betoog ik dat deze nieuwe emotionele stijl ook een invloed had op 
gewone mensen in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden. Aan de hand van een analyse van 
verhoren en getuigenissen in procesdossiers onderscheid ik ruwweg drie periodes 
in de geschiedenis van de achttiende-eeuwse gevoeligheid. Tot rond 1770 bevatten 
procesdossiers weinig sporen van het zogenaamde ‘sensibilisme’. Alleen van 
vrouwen werd soms vermeld dat ze huilden. Daar kwam verandering in tussen 1770 
en 1785, toen ook van mannen soms werd gezegd dat ze weenden. Pas in de jaren 
1780 en 1790, toen de mannelijke tranen alweer aan het verdwijnen waren, werden 
er expliciete verwijzingen naar medelijden gevonden. In het besluit reflecteer ik op 
de mogelijkheden van procesdossiers voor de geschiedschrijving van emoties.
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The Enlightened man was not only a man of reason. The Enlightened man 
was also a man of feeling. In the course of the eighteenth century, English, 
French, German and American thinkers started to consider emotions in a 
new way. Their novel approach to feeling lay at the core of the Enlightenment 
project to study human nature. Beginning in the early eighteenth century, 
English and Scottish philosophers such as the Earl of Shaftesbury, David 
Hume and Adam Smith, searching for a new principle to found a peaceful 
and moral society, developed a theory of ‘moral sentiments’. Feelings of 
sympathy for others, they argued, formed the basis of conceptions of good and 
evil and would prevent total chaos in a society driven by self-interest. Their 
ideas strongly influenced French and German philosophers, who, like Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, came to stress the virtues of pity as a natural and universal 
emotion.2
From the 1740s on, these ideas – or at least, adaptations of these 
ideas – spread through novels, plays and periodicals. Sentimentalist novels 
successfully invited their readers to sympathise with characters who dragged 
themselves from one heart-breaking incident to another, while literary 
magazines recommended a certain ‘sensibility’ to their readers.3 Sensibility 
lost many of its intellectual aspects and became a cult of visible emotional 
expression. Soon, displaying a general sensibility became a common feature 
of letters, speeches, sermons, memoirs and personal diaries all over Europe. 
Especially tears developed into an important means to show that one was a 
sensitive man or woman, concerned about the fate of his or her fellow human 
beings. Only by the end of the century, the sentimental style started to be 
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severely criticised. For this reason, the eighteenth century has been dubbed 
‘the weeping century’.4
When considering the historiography of sensibility, I was struck by two 
of its aspects. The first is its focus on a particular type of sources: philosophical 
texts, novels, diaries, letters and magazines. In these sources, sensitive men 
and women were almost exclusively of the upper middling sorts. The cult of 
sensibility has thus been interpreted as a means of upcoming, consumerist 
urbanites to distinguish themselves from both the aristocracy with its ‘stiff 
upper lip’ and from the lower rabbles most associated with cruelty.5 While I 
would not dispute that sensibility was part of a ‘bourgeois’ ideology, perhaps 
studying other sources could show that its ramifications on emotional 
practices reached further. The first aim of this article is therefore to investigate 
whether the cult of sensibility also influenced the emotional practices of 
people of lower social descent.
My second concern is about geographical differentiation in the history 
of sensibility. While the narrative of sensibility is a European one, research has 
mostly focussed on Britain, where the philosophy of fellow feeling originated, 
and France, where its cultural effects have been observed most clearly. Recent 
research has started to attend to sensibility in other countries and has found 
that it had different characteristics. The Dutch Republic, for instance, has 
traditionally been seen as a region where the culture of sensibility was only 
marginally influential. However, scholars such as Dorothee Sturkenboom, 
Herman Roodenburg and Edwina Hagen have shown that a more positive 
appreciation of sympathy and sensitivity was perceptible in Dutch journals, 
sermons and politics after circa 1760. While this evolution seems to have 
occurred later than in France, the positive appreciation of sentiment also 
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seems to have lasted longer, through the development of a more moderate 
style of emotional display.6
The aim of this article is to further analyse the geographical and 
chronological variations in the culture of sensibility. In line with the often 
contested but still popular view that the Austrian Netherlands were a 
cultural wasteland, virtually nothing has been written about sensibility 
there.7 It is my aim to investigate whether sensibility found its way into the 
Southern Netherlands and to analyse its chronology and characteristics. 
I hope to show that even while the literary production of sentimentalist 
novels and plays was limited and only occurred late in comparison to 
neighbouring countries, particular emotional practices such as male 
weeping became common around the same moment as in France, England, 
Germany and the Dutch Republic.
A history of emotions is never unproblematic. While the term 
‘emotion’ was known in the eighteenth century, it did not carry the same 
meaning as today, referring mostly to a sense of agitation.8 Sympathy would 
generally not be considered as an emotion, while weeping could signify 
much more than only emotionality or sentimentality.9 Nevertheless, I will 
use the term ‘emotion’ as shorthand to refer to the variety of feelings and 
sensations that would today be characterised as emotions, without suggesting 
that they were or should be understood as somehow similar to each other. I 
approach these emotions as practices, in the sense that Monique Scheer has 
proposed: practices of naming particular conditions, practices to evoke certain 
sensations, practices of portraying and interpreting bodily movements, 
practices to regulate other people’s emotions. These practices did not simply 
‘reflect’ inner feelings: emotions only emerged in their doing and saying.10
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homicide, 13 concern suicide and 5 concern 
sodomy. Most of the cases (58) are from the 
capital, Brussels, mainly due to the high number 
of prostitutes prosecuted, while research in 
Antwerp (36) and the smaller town of Kortrijk 
(26) has yielded a smaller number of substantial 
cases. With respect to the periodization I make, 
29 cases date from between 1750 and 1769, 
62 from between 1770 and 1785, and 29 from 
between 1785 and 1795. These numbers result in 
part from differences in preservation; they do 
not necessarily reflect the actual number of court 
cases.
It is my aim to question the historiographical narrative mainly based 
on sources such as plays, letters, memoirs and contemporary commentaries. 
Although I will refer to them in the passing, I will balance the picture 
emerging from these sources by primarily relying on criminal court records. 
Records of depositions and interrogations in criminal court reveal much 
about the emotional practices of people from lower social groups, among 
them many illiterates.
I collected 120 criminal court cases of homicide, suicide, prostitution 
and sodomy judged by the urban courts of Antwerp, Brussels and Kortrijk 
between 1750 and 1795. These 120 cases are all the cases before these courts 
concerning the selected crimes for which substantial interrogations or witness 
statements have been preserved.11 I selected four crimes – homicide, suicide, 
prostitution, sodomy – to obtain access to a diverse range of judicial and 
emotional practices. As such, I did not choose them because I expected a direct 
influence of sensibility on homicide or sodomy cases, but because they give 
a platform to a wide range of people, especially to people of the lower social 
orders. There are differences between these cases: murder inquiries were 
generally extensive and heard many witnesses. Emotions of anger and shock 
were common. Suicide cases were generally less extensive, but often probed 
the feelings of the suicide. Most common were cases of prostitution, which 
were also most concise. Few witnesses were heard; but suspects often had an 
opportunity to voice regrets. Cases of sodomy were rare, but very thorough. In 
what follows, I will not focus on the differences between these types of cases. 
I am not so much interested in how people reacted to suicide or prostitution, 
as in how these reactions changed under the influence of sensibility. The four 
types of cases provide a wide view of the workings of criminal justice and of 
the people who were confronted with it.
Like novels, memoirs and letters, criminal court records were 
produced in a specific setting, with specific intentions and unequal power 
balances. Being interrogated or testifying usually occurred in a semi-private 
setting, in the attendance of one or more magistrates, sometimes the officer 
of justice and a clerk. Testimony was written down to be used as evidence. 
The defendant or witness read the transcription, or it was read to them, and 
they had to sign that it conformed to what they had said. In some courts, 
such as in Antwerp, a public trial could follow, in which witnesses were to 
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present their testimony before a larger audience, but these testimonies were 
not recorded.12
In criminal court, people practiced emotions in a strategic and 
sometimes insincere way, to evoke mildness or severity on the part  
of the judges. Moreover, people adapted their emotions to their  
expectations of what was proper in this setting, and to the expectations  
and pressures of the magistrates. Finally, clerks writing down people’s  
words edited their narratives, perhaps leaving out emotional references 
they deemed inappropriate, perhaps selectively recording certain bodily 
movements. All this does not diminish the value of trial records, rather  
to the contrary. While the records of criminal courts do not offer transparent 
access to the voices of the common people, their power as official institutions 
ensures that trial records have a greater impact than just on the people 
involved. 
Trial records were the result of negotiations between magistrates, 
prosecutors, witnesses and defendants. If particular emotions were 
reported, this means that they were not only offered by a single witness 
or defendant, but mutually recognised by the different parties involved 
as in some respect valid. The outcome of this negotiation was not only a 
testing of existing suppositions and experiences, but in turn influenced the 
different parties’ emotional practices. While naturally, criminal courts had 
their own singularities, and I am certainly not suggesting that emotions 
should only be studied in criminal court records, criminal courts both 
reflected and influenced the wider emotional practices in the Austrian 
Netherlands. As sources for emotions history, they do not only seem useful, 
but indispensable.13
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v) 103 (Jacob Mol 1750).
Angry Young Men (1750-1770)
‘Pour la triste ville où je suis, c’est le séjour de l’ignorance, de la pesanteur, 
des ennuis, de la stupide indifférence’.14 In 1740, Voltaire not only bemoaned 
Brussels’ supposed lack of intellectual activity, but also its emotional culture. 
Brussels was a ‘sad city’ of gravity, of boredom, of indifference. Indeed, he 
implied, no traces were to be found of the delicate sensibilité that was then 
beginning to be valued so highly in Paris. Although Voltaire, longing to return 
to his friends in France, was perhaps not the most neutral observer, literary 
and theatrical culture in the Southern Netherlands was indeed not exactly 
flourishing at the time. Original literary productions were limited in number 
and rather conservative, while theatres mainly programmed vaudeville and 
spectacle plays.15 Before 1760, the increased display of emotions on Parisian 
stages, for instance in the ‘comédies larmoyantes’, hardly resonated in the 
Southern Netherlands.16 In the criminal court cases I analysed from between 
1750 and 1770, I have also found no traces of the cult of sensibility. 
Ten years after Voltaire’s sobering sketch of life in Brussels, fruiterer 
Jacob Mol was interrogated in Antwerp for having stabbed his wife, Françoise 
Ketelaer. Asked why he had done so, he told judges that it was ‘because he had 
been in fury and huge anger’. Since their marriage nine years ago, Ketelaer had 
continuously insulted him, argued with him, and even attacked him. They had 
been officially separated for some time, but had recently started living together 
again. On the fatal night, however, Ketelaer was once again insulting him and 
had blown out the candles. Angry and fearful that she would hurt him, as she 
had done before, he took a knife and stabbed her. ‘Now I think I’ll have to die for 
a bitch’, he then said to himself, for he thought he had killed her. He put on his 
best clothes and went to an officer of justice to turn himself in: ‘you have to take 
me to prison, I have done an accident, I believe my wife is kaput.’17
She was, it turned out, not kaput, but had survived the stabbing. Mol’s 
parents immediately petitioned for grace and the Antwerp judges were asked 
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for their advice. They agreed that Mol had committed his crime in a rage. ‘If the 
wickedness of a woman may excuse such an excess of rage’, they observed, several 
witnesses had confirmed that Ketelaer was ‘a veritable fury’. All things considered, 
the judges advised that the case was suitable for receiving grace, as it had not been 
a premeditated crime, but ‘a sudden rage’, provoked by the victim’s insults. Their 
advice was followed and Mol received grace on Good Friday.18
The emotional practices in Mol’s case are typical for many cases of 
violent behaviour between 1750 and 1770. Anger is one of the most frequently 
mentioned emotions in the trial records I studied, particularly in homicide 
cases.19 People were generally said to be angry when they were being insulted 
or accused of something, upon which they started shouting or became 
violent. The fact that this was recorded as such shows that suspects, witnesses 
and magistrates agreed that anger was an emotion which was expected and 
understandable in these situations. It was not necessarily accepted, however, 
as anger was generally negatively commented upon. It always figured as an 
excess that people should have been able to control. 
For men, however, this excess was sometimes acceptable to the court, 
when their honour had been challenged. It could therefore be used as an 
excuse for committing a crime.20 Since the sixteenth century, men who 
petitioned for grace and claimed to have been in a state of anger during 
their offences were often pardoned.21 For women, in contrast, it was always 
an indication of their poor character. While men of all social status were 
sometimes said to be angry, only a few women were called angry, and they 
were all of the lowest descent. While witnesses in the case against Mol 
indicated that both Mol and Ketelaer were continually cursing and fighting, 
only Ketelaer was said to be ‘an evil serpent of a bitch’ and ‘as vicious as a 
hellish devil’.22 In the context of a trial, anger could only be understood as 
appropriate for people in a dominant position. Women angry with their 
husbands were out of line.23
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For people not in a superior position, negative situations often 
resulted in reports of emotional practices similar to anger, but more passive. 
Although there was a great variety in these practices, I will group them as 
‘sadness’, which I use as a generic description for more passive practices 
that were interpreted as related to regret, dissatisfaction, complaint and 
disappointment.24 Both men and women were reported to be sad, but the 
emotion was again most often reported among men. After Francis Verlinden 
had shot one of his hunting mates in 1752, he was ‘inconsolable’, witnesses 
testified, ‘very upset and lamenting about the incident’.25 Similarly, after 
Pierre van de Wiele had shot a man near Kortrijk in 1757, he claimed to be 
‘deploring the fatal moment day and night’, as it had been an accident.26 Both 
applied for grace, but only Verlinden was successful, as he had more clearly 
established that the victim had been a close friend and that his grief was 
therefore sincere. This illustrates that emotional practices were also evaluated 
by the court: naming emotions did not suffice; the circumstances had to be 
right.
When these and other men were sad, they made this clear through 
their facial expression, by sighing, lamenting or keeping silent, but not – 
or at least this was never reported – by weeping. This corresponds with a 
common historiographical theme that in this period and in a secular context, 
weeping was considered a feminine practice. Men were only supposed to cry 
on very specific occasions, for instance, at the death of a child or partner, and 
even then, excess was to be avoided.27 After he had accidently fired his gun, 
numerous witnesses testified that Francis Verlinden was ‘moaning heavily’ 
and ‘lamenting heavily’ for days after the event, but no-one said that he had 
wept.28 Similarly, after Peter Coelembier had killed a man in a pub fight in 
Kuurne, near Kortrijk, witnesses observed him ‘pitying himself with great 
melancholy for having done an accident’ and ‘moaning and calling on God 
and His saints for solace.’29 But he was not reported to have wept. This may 
indicate that these men had not wept. This may indicate that they had wept, 
but that witnesses had not reported this. Or this may indicate that scribes had 
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The death of friends was one of the rare occasions that allowed men to 
weep, and even then only with moderation. In this painting by Joseph 
Denis Odevaere (1775-1830), the capitally convicted Phocio remains 
heroically calm while waiting to take the deadly poison that his friends 
have already consumed.
Joseph Denis Odevaere, The Death of Phocio, 1804.
Collection Musea Brugge-Groeningemuseum. Photo: Lukas – Art in 
Flanders vzw (www.lukasweb.be).
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chosen not to write this down. In any case, it signals that male weeping was 
found inappropriate in these circumstances. 
The only incidents of weeping reported before the 1770s concern 
women weeping after someone close had died. Desperate after yet another 
argument with his wife Catharina Devinck in 1752, Nijt van der Neusen had 
committed suicide. After Devinck found him, witnesses saw her ‘in shock, 
lamenting and weeping so much’.30 In 1759, neighbours were woken at night 
when they heard a young woman crying. When they came to see what was 
going on, they found that her father had stabbed her brother and run off.31 
In both cases, the shock of discovering the death of a close relative allowed a 
woman to weep. In the records studied, men in similar situations were never 
reported to be crying.
Weeping for the Killer (1770-1785)
In 1771, upon hearing that Jean-Jacques Rousseau would be prosecuted 
in France, Prince Charles-Joseph de Ligne wrote a famous letter, inviting 
Rousseau to join him on his estate in Beloeil in the Southern Netherlands: ‘On 
ne sait pas lire dans mon pays; vous ne serez ni admiré ni persecuté’.32 When 
Ligne met Rousseau afterwards and the latter said that he preferred to stay in 
Paris, Ligne replied, as he later recalled, ‘with tears in his eyes’, ‘[b]e happy, sir. 
Be happy despite yourself.’33
Rousseau stood for the public and intense expression of feeling. His 
popularity in France coincided with the height of the cult of sensibility. In 
sentimental novels and bourgeois dramas, French citizens were confronted 
with an abundance of moral dilemmas and with characters shedding 
numerous tears.34 As argued by scholars of sentimentalism such as Frank 
Baasner and William Reddy, this led to a ‘trivialisation’ (perhaps we should 
more neutrally call it a ‘transformation’) of sentimentalism in the 1770s and 
1780s. Sentimentalism lost its intellectual aspects and the visible expression 
of sentiment became fashionable through all layers of society.35 While earlier, 
men were not often supposed to weep, in this new emotional culture, things 
article – artikel
36 Sturkenboom, ‘Historicizing the Gender’, 60-64; 
Capp, ‘Jesus Wept’, 106.
37 Hugo De Schampeleire, ‘Verplichte lectuur 
te Antwerpen en Parijs in de 18e eeuw. Een 
comparatief quantitatief leesonderzoek naar 
Voltaire, Rousseau en de Encyclopedie’, in: 
L’influence française dans les Pays-Bas autrichiens 
et la Principauté de Liège au temps de Voltaire et 
de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Brussels 1979) 132-153; 
Michèle Mat, ‘Boeken, ideeën, genootschappen 
in het Oostenrijkse “België”’, in: Hervé 
Hasquin (ed.), Oostenrijks België, 1713-1794: de 
Zuidelijke Nederlanden onder de Oostenrijkse 
Habsburgers (Brussels 1987) 239-262; Karel 
Bostoen, ‘Verlichte letteren in de Zuidelijke 
Nederlanden?’, in: Andreas Hanou (ed.), 
Verlichte letteren in Noord en Zuid (Leuven 2004) 
393-403, 396.
38 Cited in Van Oostveldt, The Théâtre de la Monnaie, 
70.
39 ‘Sentimenteele knaepjes’. Published in 
Den Vlaemschen Indicateur in 1787; cited in 
Jozef Smeyers, ‘Mevrouw de mode in de 
Vlaemschen Indicateur (1779-1787)’, in: Literair- 
en cultuurhistorische bijdragen: van Rousseau en 
Amerika tot Aalst en Brussel. Cahiers 25 (Brussels 
2004) 72-77, 74. Similar observations were made 
in Dutch journals: Sturkenboom, Spectators van 
hartstocht, 344-352. See also Tom Verschaffel, 
De weg naar het binnenland: geschiedenis van de 
Nederlandse literatuur 1700-1800, de Zuidelijke 
Nederlanden (Amsterdam 2017) 177-178.
40 Cornelius Franciscus Nelis, Oraison funèbre de 
Marie-Thérèse (Brussels 1781) 3, 23. Cf. Verschaffel, 
De weg naar het binnenland, 228-235.
41 Pirotte, ‘Les grâces du Vendredi saint’, 94.
were changing: the ‘man of feeling’ was allowed to show his sensitivity, and 
even weep in public.36
Despite the Prince’s disdainful remarks about the country’s literacy, 
most recent French literary products, including sentimentalist ones, were 
by the 1770s well distributed in the Southern Netherlands, even if original 
productions of sentimentalist work remained rare. Booksellers sold the most 
recent Parisian bestsellers, while book clubs promoted discussion of the new 
ideas.37 Since the 1760s, sentimental plays were performed on stage as well. 
Already in 1761, the Annonces et avis divers des Pays-Bas commented on ‘the 
delicious pleasure of shedding tears’ in a review of a performance of Diderot’s 
bourgeois drama Le Père de famille in Brussels.38 In the 1780s, some periodicals 
criticised French-loving ‘sentimental lads’.39 It should not surprise, then, that 
at the death of Empress Maria Theresa in 1780, Cornelis Franciscus de Nelis, 
who spoke a eulogy in Brussels, reported that the whole kingdom was ‘in 
tears’, which were ‘shed with abundance’.40
In criminal courts, the emotional practices that I described in the 
previous section partially continued in the records of 1770s and 1780s. Men 
whose honour was challenged continued to be reported as angry and violent, 
although the excuse of male anger became less effective and was no longer 
considered sufficient grounds for grace.41 Men and women alike continued to 
profess shock and sadness after committing or witnessing crime. Tears were 
still shed after finding out that someone close had died. Remarkably, however, 
whereas before 1770 and after 1785, I have not found a single report of male 
weeping, nine men were now reported to be weeping too – as compared to 
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only seven women (in a total of 62 cases).42 The numbers are not huge, but 
clearly contrast with the earlier period. Moreover, these men did not just cry 
out of shock for what had just happened, but they also expressed grief of a 
different nature. 
Let me expand on two cases. The first one concerns Jacob Ceulemans, 
a miller in his twenties, living in Laken near Brussels, in 1781. While playing 
cards, Ceulemans got in a row with Jan van Heijmbeeck, who insulted him. 
Both were ‘in gruesome anger’. After some arguing, Ceulemans walked away, 
with Heijmbeeck in pursuit. In a dark alley, they started fighting. Ceulemans 
pulled a knife, stabbed his opponent and ran off. Passers-by found Heijmbeeck 
and called for a surgeon, but his intervention was to no avail: Heijmbeeck soon 
died of his injuries. Later that night, Ceulemans went to the same surgeon, 
asking him to come to attend to his father, who was supposedly ill. While they 
walked together, Ceulemans asked him ‘whether nothing had happened in 
the parish’, and the surgeon told him that Heijmbeeck had died. ‘It’s a sad 
time for the one who did it’, Ceulemans replied. When they reached the mill 
where Ceulemans’ father lived, the surgeon soon realised that no-one was ill. 
He saw Ceulemans go into the kitchen with his father and witnessed them 
weep together, as the father told his son to flee.43
A second case took place in Antwerp in 1782. A group of textile worker 
friends went to an inn for a drink. While heading home, they ran into a fight 
between Jan De Corte and another man, who objected to De Corte having 
looked into his daughter’s eyes for too long. Things escalated and De Corte 
fled into his house. Some people followed him and the fighting continued. 
Ten minutes later, the corpse of one of the textile workers was found in 
the house. De Corte was the prime suspect, but there were apparently no 
witnesses. When the victim’s friends headed to the mayor to report the killing, 
people saw that they were weeping and moaning. When they were heard 
during the trial, judges asked them why they were doing so. ‘We were pitying 
the deceased, as well as his killer,’ one of them said. Another claimed to have 
said to his friends ‘let us, instead of weeping, rather read a paternoster for his 
soul.’44
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In these two cases, men’s tears were explicitly commented upon. 
These men cried in a distinct way: they were not weeping alone, they were 
weeping together with other men. Moreover, certainly in the second case, 
they were not weeping out of shock or for their own sad fate, but because 
they sympathised with others. It is remarkable that in both cases, men were 
ostensibly eliciting compassion not only for the victim, but also for the killer – 
even if, in Ceulemans’ case, this turned out to be self-pity. This agrees very well 
with the values of sentimentalism: men of feeling were not supposed to worry 
about themselves, but primarily about others.45 Nevertheless, these men 
were still closely involved in the situation they wept about: Ceulemans’ father 
wept about his son’s fate, and the textile workers’ tears led judges to question 
whether the killer had not been a friend of them. While this is contrary to 
some sentimentalist authors who suggested that men of feeling should also 
feel for strangers, it agrees with David Hume’s observation that sympathy 
was strongest when resemblance was the highest, and that therefore ‘the 
sentiments of others have little influence when far remov’d from us’.46
Between 1770 and 1785, I have found roughly four scenarios in 
the trial records in which crying occurred. First, as in the previous period, 
some women cried upon discovering a dead body, out of shock. Men were 
never reported to be crying out of shock. Second, as in the examples above, 
some men and women were reported to weep out of sadness, perhaps even 
out of compassion. A third scenario has people weeping after they had 
done something, or something had happened to them, that they knew 
was reprehensible. It was a way of practicing regret, shame or guilt. For 
instance, in 1777, Catharina Tusson’s daughter had had sex with a man and 
received money. She claimed that she had been forced to do so. To support 
her innocence, her mother reported that she was ‘still weeping every day’.47 
Similarly, while Peter Hengs committed sodomy with an older man, he 
‘continually wept out of regret’, despite his partner’s reassurances.48 Finally, 
crying could occur when people were in a very grim situation, as a practice of 
desperation and misery. When Jan De Corte continued to deny the murder 
allegations, judges had him chained in a dark and cold cellar, where during 
one visit, they found him weeping.49
The cult of sensibility is often associated with the ‘middle class’ or 
the ‘bourgeoisie’, as part of their attempts to differentiate themselves from 
the aristocracy on the one hand and common people on the other.50 The 
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references to sentimental practices in criminal records are too sparse to 
come to definitive conclusions, but what I have found does point in a certain 
direction. I have not encountered any aristocratic weeping men in the court 
records, but that is probably due to their very infrequent appearances in 
criminal court. The writings of the Prince de Ligne reveal that at least some of 
them happily participated in the new emotional culture.51 The weeping men 
whom I have found, however, are certainly not all of the higher ‘middle class’: 
the textile workers in the case against Jan De Corte were not even able to write 
their own names, and millers Jacob Ceulemans and his father were hardly 
among the better sorts. Most of the people who testified about weeping would 
certainly not have read intellectual works on sensibility – although some of 
them may have seen a sentimental play or read a novel.52 Most were skilled 
artisans, mainly associates and some masters: weavers, millers, cobblers. No 
journeymen or beggars were reported weeping, but lower middling sorts 
did apparently take part in the new emotional culture. It seems to have had a 
wider reach than just the ‘bourgeoisie’.
The increased – but still limited – reporting of male tears could again 
be interpreted in different ways. It could be that men wept more often; 
that witnesses reported this more often; that judges or scribes found this 
more noteworthy. But that does not change the conclusion that apparently 
between around 1770 and 1785 the official records of the criminal court, 
which resulted from a compromise between all the actors involved, show 
that it was not unthinkable that men, even those of the lower social orders, 
wept in particular circumstances. In contrast with the angry women, this 
was not negatively evaluated. These findings suggest that, between 1770 
and 1785, the cult of sensibility had an impact on emotional practices in the 
Southern Netherlands. However, these emotional practices were perhaps not 
so much influenced by an intellectual ‘sensibility’, as by a more visible and 
more tangible ‘sentimentalism’, which stimulated the overt display of tears. 
In plays, novels and eulogies, but also in society at large, people witnessed the 
rise of tears and learned its uses. The interactions and official recordings in 
criminal courts further normalised the new practices of weeping.
Suing with Sympathy (1780-1795)
In 1796, Jan Hofman’s bourgeois drama Den onbermhartigen schuld-eisscher was 
performed in Kortrijk for the first time. In its opening lines, count Verhulst, 
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Abraham Solomon, Waiting for the Verdict, 1859.
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the merciless creditor in the title, demanded immediate payment of overdue 
rents by the poor old Lambrecht. While Lambrecht lamented on his poverty 
(‘Dat ik uw Schuldenaar moest zyn, heb ik beschreid met bittre traanen’), his 
daughter Lidia bemoaned the count’s lack of compassion (‘Uw hart gevoeld 
geenszins het minste medely’). 
Verhulst, however, would not bend, on the contrary, in all his villainy, 
he suddenly revealed Lidia’s best kept secret: that her so-called sister Julia was 
actually her illegitimate daughter. Lidia fainted. Upon recovering, she confessed 
to Julia, that indeed, she was not her sister. ‘Neen, mijn Julia! Ik ben uw eigen 
moeder.’ Only after many exclamation marks, suspension points, sighs, and 
tears, it was revealed that the rightful heir of the county was not Verhulst, but 
Julia’s father, Lidia’s lover. When Verhulst was dethroned, but pardoned by 
the new count, he finally realised that greed had led him to abandon virtue, in 
particular compassion for the poor, and promised to mend his ways.53
In the last twenty years of the eighteenth century, the original 
production of sentimental works in the Southern Netherlands finally took off. 
Sentimental outpourings were no longer limited to eulogies. In the bourgeois 
dramas of middle-class rhetoricians such as Hofman in Kortrijk and Pieter-
Joost de Borchgrave in Wakken, emotional display stood central.54 Cornelis 
Franciscus de Nelis’ collection of dialogues L’aveugle de la montagne opened with 
a recently blind father telling his moaning son not to pity him too much.55 
In 1785, the Vlaemschen Indicateur published a story about a man pitying his 
suffering dog, while in another story, a young man wept out of sympathy with 
a stranger who had lost his house in a flood.56
In neighbouring countries, however, sentimentalism was starting to 
receive criticism. At the end of the eighteenth century, the ‘man of feeling’ 
who recited poetry and wept in sympathy with the sad fate of fellow humans 
was increasingly considered unmanly. The cult of sensibility was found to be 
passive, lacking in activity. Feelings had to be put to action.57 The sincerity 
of public emotional expressions came to be doubted.58 The political turmoil 
at the end of the century and the new focus on rigid gender identities left 
little room for male sentimentalism: honour once again became the guiding 
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principle for male behaviour. Male tears once again became effeminate, 
shameful and unnatural. Sensibility became a female and private affair.59
The trial records I consulted from between 1785 and 1795 seem to 
confirm this picture. After 1785, no more men were reported to be weeping. 
Illuminating in this respect is the case of Maria Reps in 1789. Reps was 
married, but had been sleeping with another man, Joannes Dingemans, for 
several years. For unclear reasons – adultery was almost never prosecuted at the 
time – the case came to court and after her interrogation, the scribe noted that 
Reps ‘has fallen on her knees before the commissioners and shown great grief 
over her mistakes, and cried bitter tears, begging and requesting’ a settlement. 
When Dingemans was questioned, he too asked for forgiveness, but it was 
simply stated that he requested a settlement for having kept a relationship 
with Reps while she was married. The woman wept, the man did not.60
The sentimental plays seem like an anomaly. They were, admittedly, 
late examples of the sentimental style. But they already bear the mark of 
changing emotional practices, for, while Lambrecht claims to have wept 
bitterly over his debts, it are clearly Lidia and Julia who are most overtly 
sentimental, constantly trembling, sighing, weeping and fainting on stage. 
Moreover, the central theme of the play – the virtue of compassion – was 
still a pressing issue. As I indicated in the introduction, sympathy lay at the 
heart of the sentimental project.61 In the philosophy of sensibility, feelings of 
sympathy would lead to a better, more moral world. This ideal led to a more 
positive appreciation of emotions and especially of tears, as symbolised by the 
weeping men I discussed in the previous section. Slightly later, it also resulted 
in more people explicitly referring to sympathy in criminal courts. Thus, in 
the Southern Netherlands, the age of sensibility was not entirely over. While 
the most visible expressions of sentimentalism, male tears, were disappearing, 
its underlying principle started to flourish precisely in this period. 
Between 1780 and 1795, sympathy and compassion were more often 
referred to in trial records than before. Of course, compassion had always had 
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a place in criminal trials. When applying for grace, supplicants appealed to the 
compassion of the king. While this display of compassion was the prerogative 
of the sovereign, magistrates and prosecutors were asked for advice and 
also framed this in terms of compassion.62 When Peter Coelembier applied 
for grace in 1765, the prosecutor advised that his ‘gruesome malice merits 
punishment rather than compassion’.63 In the case of Nicolas Kreijsscher in 
1772, however, both judges and prosecutor suggested that he was ‘worthy 
of commiseration’.64 Outside the sphere of grace, however, the language of 
compassion or sympathy was rarely spoken in criminal court.
However, starting in the 1770s, the language of compassion began 
to occur in witness statements. Compassion appears as an active sentiment, 
clearly rooted in ideals of catholic Misericordia, in the idea that people had 
to assist fellow Christians in need to ensure their own salvation.65 While 
these ideals were centuries old, they are not referred to in the trials of the 
1750s and the 1760s. In 1774, however, a spinner told judges that she 
had employed and sheltered Anna Catharina Van den Rijn, suspected of 
infanticide, ‘out of compassion.’66 Another woman had lodged a suspected 
prostitute ‘out of pure sympathy’ in Antwerp in 1787, which yet another 
woman in Brussels had equally done ‘out of compassion’ in 1791, as the 
prostitute in question had been ‘almost naked’.67 These and other women, 
some of them literate, some of them not, used the language of compassion 
to protect themselves and take distance from the reprehensible individuals 
whom they had apparently supported. Surprisingly, perhaps, a language 
that was intended to connect people was used as a tool to stress difference 
and superiority. But the fact that they were able to use this language shows 
its growing importance.
This patronising form of caritas-like compassion was not only 
referred to by women. Men similarly used the language of compassion to 
create distance from other people. This could be particularly urgent for men 
suspected of sodomy. Such was the case for Peter Stocker, a cobbler tried in 
Antwerp in 1781. Two young men had told judges that Stocker had seduced 
them and had intercourse with them. When these magistrates questioned 
Stocker, he was asked why one of them, Philip Mainard, had spent so much 
time at his house. Stocker told them that Mainard came to his house because 
he did not have fire at his own place, and ‘that he sometimes gave him some 
article – artikel
68 ‘Dat hij hem uijt compassie somtijts wel eenen 
boterham gaf’. fa 731 1514/2.
69 ‘Par compassion’. sab ah Proces 8209.
70 ‘Sulcx gesien hebbende, daer van groot 
medelijden hadde’, ‘sulcx niet konnende sien’. sab 
ah Proces 7124 and 8146.
71 H.J. Vieu-Kuik and Jos Smeyers, Geschiedenis van 
de letterkunde der Nederlanden 6 (Antwerp 1975) 
475-476.
bread out of compassion’, but denied all other allegations.68 In the same year, 
when Joannes Le Febure claimed that Georges Beauclerk, Duke of  
Saint-Albans, had tried to buy his sexual services in Brussels, the Duke 
asserted that he had only given Le Febure a little money ‘out of compassion’.69
In the 1780s, this form of compassion was joined by another, more 
passive and more egalitarian form. This form was often called ‘sympathy’ 
in English literature, but contemporaries in the Southern Netherlands do 
not seem to have made such a difference between terms like ‘compassie’, 
‘meedoogen’ or ‘medelijden’– they could refer to both active, patronising 
and passive, egalitarian sentiments. The more egalitarian sentiment can be 
witnessed in the cases that I discussed in the previous section: the companions 
of Jan de Corte wept out of sympathy with the victim and the perpetrator of 
the crime, while Jacob Ceulemans expressed his pity for the killer (although 
it was ill-disguised self-pity). Such passive forms of compassion were also 
testified of during the revolutionary turmoil of the late 1780s and early 1790s. 
The case against Joannes Bulens in 1791 is emblematic in this respect. 
In October 1790, Willem van Kriecken, a supporter of the more radical 
revolutionary faction, the Vonckists, was publically hanged by supporters 
of the opposing faction, the Statists, among them Joannes Bulens. Although 
the Statists were in power at the time, the hanging had not been officially 
sanctioned. Shortly afterwards, the Austrian government was restored and 
in early 1791, the perpetrators of the hanging were prosecuted. Witnesses of 
the execution, which had taken place on the Grand Place in Brussels, were 
plenty. However, many of the witnesses allegedly left after they had become 
aware of what was happening. One 28-year-old fish seller told judges that 
he had encountered the crowd escorting their victim and ‘seeing this, he felt 
great compassion, and quickly retired’. When he later saw them again on 
the Grand Place, he ‘couldn’t bear to watch’ and left. Many other witnesses, 
all men of the middling sorts, testified that they were unable to watch such 
atrocities because they sympathised with the victim, or that they were in 
shock afterwards.70 Rather than showing the savagery of the rabble, as some 
have interpreted the hanging of Van Kriecken, the state of shock that many 
witnesses testified of is testament to the sensibilities of the time.71
Even prosecutors started to frame their demands in terms of sympathy 
and compassion. They traditionally took the harsh stance. While they could 
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show clemency by not prosecuting someone, when they did prosecute, their 
most emotional outpourings were calls for severity and, though infrequently, 
impatience or anger. In the case against Joannes Bulens, however, the prosecutor 
used the language of sympathy: the defendant had been granted a solicitor, who 
was stalling the case, to the annoyance of the prosecutor. He claimed that the 
solicitor was acting against the interest of his client and portrayed himself as 
concerned with the well-being of ‘the poor prisoner’, whom the solicitor ‘made 
suffer in prison all this time’. Given that Bulens could be convicted to death, we 
should probably not take the prosecutor at his word, but it is significant that he 
used the language of sympathy to make his case.72
Sympathy, it could be said, had become an intrinsic part of criminal 
justice, just like anger had been before. In Kortrijk in 1788, Augustin Strobbe 
even went so far as to suggest that the display of sympathy destroyed his 
guilt. In 1787, Strobbe was drinking in an inn. The innkeeper refused to 
serve Strobbe any more beer, judging that he was already too drunk. Strobbe 
answered that he still had all his strength and to prove this he went outside to 
move a cart. The owner of the cart, however, tried to stop Strobbe from doing 
so. Strobbe then hit the owner, who fell badly, had a severe head injury and 
died some weeks later. In his defence, Strobbe’s solicitor argued that Strobbe 
was acting ‘uncontrollably and tempered’, which should not surprise, as he 
was known as ‘Pierre the rude’ for his hot temper. Moreover, the solicitor 
continued, after the fall, Strobbe had helped to carry his victim to his house, 
‘which sympathy clearly shows that the defendant was not in wrath’.73 As the 
excuse value of anger had diminished, sympathy was now to remove guilt.
A form of sensibility closer to its intellectual origins thus found 
its way into criminal courts and into society through the language of 
sympathy and compassion, be it slightly later than the language of tears. The 
association with gender and social status is also less clear: the most striking 
changes are found among elite men – prosecutors and solicitors – but lower 
middling men and women, literate and illiterate, also started to refer more 
often to various forms of compassion. At a time when sensibility started 
to be criticised abroad and when male tears were starting to disappear, 
the value of sympathy was affirmed in the Southern Netherlands, both in 
literary and in legal contexts.
In Conclusion: What the Tears of a Killer Can Tell Us
In the second half of the eighteenth century, emotions functioned in roughly 
three ways in criminal trials. First, when the accused had practiced certain 
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emotions after their supposed crime, judges were eager to consider this as a 
sign of their guilt. For instance, in some cases judges asked suspects why they 
had been weeping, with a distinct indication that this confirmed that they had 
done something wrong.74 A second reason for the legal interest in emotions 
was that they could explain behaviour and even be seen as a reduction of 
responsibility. A ‘state of anger’, or ‘desperation’, for instance, was sometimes 
cited by defendants or witnesses in their favour as a cause for doing something 
they would otherwise not have done. They had not been themselves during 
their actions and were, as a consequence, not fully responsible. Finally, 
practicing and naming emotions in court was a way of provoking sympathy 
among judges. Defendants took responsibility for their actions, but practiced 
guilt, shame or regret, hoping to gain a more favourable sentence.
Given this pragmatic interest in emotions in the criminal justice 
system, the changing emotional practices in criminal trial records could 
be interpreted in different ways. Very minimally, they can be seen as mere 
changes in the fashionable writing style of trial records, or as changes in 
the (legal) priorities of judges, solicitors and scribes: as they became more 
interested in tears and sympathy, they started to record it more often. A 
slightly broader interpretation could suggest that the emotional practices 
reported in criminal courts were indeed not the result of changing emotions 
among witnesses and defendants, but the result of their changing ideas about 
what judges wanted to hear. If people started to refer more to tears or to 
compassion, this interpretation would suggest, this was not because they wept 
more often or were moved by others’ misery, but because they expected that 
judges wanted to hear this. The final and most generous interpretation would 
allow that people’s changing emotional practices in court actually reflected 
their changing emotional practices elsewhere and that criminal court records 
therefore provide reliable evidence of everyday emotional lives.
I would argue that none of these interpretations do justice to the 
emotional practices found in criminal court records. I believe that criminal 
trial records provide more than just a glimpse into the specific emotional 
setting of the criminal court or even into the emotional lives of the people 
involved. Criminal law and criminal trials not only reflected models of society, 
but also provided models for society. Criminal courts are, as Ute Frevert has 
suggested, ‘emotional institutions’.75 They are formative of emotions, shape 
their language, suggest which emotions are acceptable or commendable and 
which are not. In the courts, in the interaction between judges, prosecutors, 
solicitors, witnesses, victims and defendants, emotional practices were 
evaluated, stimulated and repressed. Criminal trials involved many people 
who were influenced by its debates and decisions and who in turn influenced 
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others, precisely because of the status of the court. Considering the criminal 
court as formative of emotional practices allows us to bridge the gap between 
court and society, just like the concept of emotional practices itself bridges 
the gap between expression and experience.76 While we should not ignore 
strategical statements and power dynamics, what happened in criminal 
court should not be dismissed as just strategical. Like novels and magazines, 
trial records only show a particular context of emotions; but like these other 
sources, trials also form people’s emotions.
This approach implies that trial records are significant sources when 
discussing the emotional culture of the Southern Netherlands. First of all, I 
have shown that the cult of sensibility, which characterised many European 
countries in the second half of the eighteenth century, also had an impact on 
the Southern Netherlands, despite its reputation as backward country and 
its lack of original literary productions. In criminal courts, new emotional 
practices were negotiated and spread – even if the extent of the new practices 
remains difficult assess. I have distinguished three phases in the history 
of this cult. In the first phase, up to around 1770, few traces of the cult of 
sensibility could be found in the Austrian Netherlands, neither in trial records 
nor in literary productions. Anger and sadness were the dominant emotions 
found in trial records. Only women were occasionally reported as weeping. 
This changed in the 1770s and early 1780s: although weeping was still not 
reported very often, criminal courts now accepted that men also wept, often 
even in public. These visible practices of sentimentalism were initially not 
accompanied by references to the all-important emotion of sympathy. Only 
in the 1780s and 1790s, when male tears were already disappearing again, 
explicit references to compassion, sympathy and pity found their way into 
both trial records and literary productions.
My analysis is based on a limited sample of 120 criminal cases. 
Studying more cases may reveal occasional weeping men in the 1750s or 
1790s, or may require adjusting the boundaries of the three phases. From 
what I have found, however, the occurrence of weeping men in the Southern 
Netherlands coincided with what has been called a ‘trivialisation’ of 
sentimentalism in France and Germany in the 1770s and 1780s. With respect 
to this visible expression of sensibility, the Southern Netherlands therefore 
seems to have followed a similar chronology as its neighbouring countries. 
However, the intellectual underpinning of sentimentalism, the expression 
of sympathy, only came up much later than in neighbouring countries. In 
French, British and American novels, essays, newspapers and pamphlets, for 
instance, the language of sympathy gained currency from the 1740s on.77 
In Dutch literary reviews, in contrast, sympathy only became a popular 
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theme from 1770 on.78 Like in the Northern Netherlands, then, it seems 
that the more subtle form of sentimentalism arrived later in the Southern 
Netherlands, and lasted longer, than its visible expression through male tears.
Sensibility most visibly affected male emotional practices, as men 
were only reported to weep during a short period, roughly between 1770 
and 1785. Contrary to what is commonly accepted, I have found that the 
changing weeping practices did not only affect bourgeois men: at least some 
noblemen and perhaps more surprisingly, some illiterate men also started 
to weep in a new way. With respect to references to sympathy, social and 
gender differentiation is less clear. The most visible changes here are among 
prosecutors and solicitors, but lower middling men and women, literate and 
illiterate, also started to refer more often to various forms of compassion and 
sympathy.
The tears of the killers in this article show us that the culture of 
sensibility may have started in Britain and France as an intellectual and 
bourgeois affair, but that it transformed in its dissemination. As ideas were 
set into practices and spread through plays, literary magazines, eulogies, 
criminal courts and other institutions, it was primarily the most visible aspect 
of sensibility, weeping, that quickly gained currency, not only among the 
bourgeoisie, but also among common people. However, as male tears once 
again disappeared, the underlying idea of sympathy continued its spread. An 
expressive form of sentimentalism preceded a more intellectual one, and was 
outlived by it.
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